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Article 3

COMMENTS
CIVIL CODE SECTION 163.5: SOLUTION OR ENIGMA?
By

DONALD W. CuRRAN*

and

KENNETH

W.

ROSENTHAI.*

Nowhere are the important California legislative changes of 1957 more
striking than in the field of community property. The legislature brought
about a basic change in community property law by enactment of section
163.5 of the Civil Code:
"All damages, special and general, awarded a married person in a civil
action for personal injuries, are the separate property of such married
person."'

It is the purpose of this comment to present a brief discussion of the statute's probable effect, first on the law of negligence and second, on the law
of damages.

Effect of Section 163.5 on Negligence as Between Spouses
Prior to the enactment of Civil Code Section 163.5, California courts
had held recovery for personal injuries of either spouse to be community
property 2 If contributory negligence by one of the spouses was established,
such negligence would be imputed to the injured spouse and bar recovery
as against a negligent defendant.3 The rationale for the rule was that if
community recovery were allowed, it would have permitted the contributorily negligent spouse to share in the community proceeds and thereby be
unjustly enriched by a wrong he himself had helped to bring about.4
With the enactment of section 163.5, the recovery for personal injuries
by the injured spouse is now made his or her separate property. Hence the
reason for imputing the contributory negligence to the innocent spouse
no longer exists; the recovery is not community property, and the errant
spouse can no longer be enriched by his own wrong.5
* Members, Third-Year Class.

STATS. C.2334 (1957). See 32 CAixr. S.B.J. 507 (1957).
Leeper v. Nelson, 139 Cal. App. 2d 65, 293 P. 2d Ill (1956) ; Giorgetti v. Wollaston, 83
Cal. App. 358, 257 Pac. 109 (1927).
3 Johnson v. Warner, 116 Cal. App. 2d 598, 254 P. 2d 124 (1953) ; Zaragosa v. Craven, 33
Cal. 2d 315, 202 P.2d 73 (1949) ; McFadden v. Santa Ana Ry., 87 Cal. 464, 25 Pac. 681 (1891).
4 Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Cal.2d 254, 273 P.2d 257 (1954) ; Basler v. Sacramento Gas & Elec.
Co., 158 Cal. 514, I1 Pac. 530 (1910) ; Cf. Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal. 2d 622, 248 P.2d 922 (1952).
See De Funiak, Personal Injuries under the California Community Property Law, 15 LA.L.
21 CAL.

Rv.526 (1955).

5 Louisiana Civil Code art. 2402 is similar to California Civil Code § 163.5 as to the wife,
in that the Louisiana statute makes her recovery for personal injuries separate property. Hence
if husband is contributorily negligent, his negligence is not imputed to his wife, Elba v. Thomas,
(La. App.) 59 So.2d 732 (1952). If the wife is contributorily negligent, however, the negligence must be imputed to the husband, see Levy v. New Orleans & N.E.R. Co, (La. App.)
20 So.2d 559 (1945), rehearing denied, 21 So.2d 155 (1945).
[291]
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The imputation doctrine as between spouses has, in effect, been rendered inapplicable by section 163.5. But the section does raise a number of
questions; the answers must await judicial interpretation. It is felt that
some of the problems which may arise can be anticipated and might be
analyzed at this time. This comment will be confined to problems seemingly introduced by the enactment of section 163.5, and will not discuss
possible legislative changes that might be made to supplement the existing
statute. 6
Automobile collisions.-Most personal injury cases arise out of automobile collisions. Let us assume that a collision occurs in which one spouse
is contributorily negligent while driving, and that the other spouse brings
suit for injuries as against a third party defendant. The law on this question was settled prior to enactment of section 163.5; negligence of the
errant spouse was imputed to the injured spouse and thereby barred the
7
latter's recovery as against the defendant.
It has been pointed out that the imputation doctrine as between spouses
has apparently been rendered inapplicable by section 163.5. This does not
mean, however, that the door has been closed to imputing the negligence
of one spouse to the other outside community property law.
Foremost g.nong the possibilities of imputing negligence as between
the spouses znthat presented by section 402 of the Vehicle Code:
"Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable.., for the death of or injury to
persrns or property resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor
vehicle.., by any person using or operating the same with the permission,
express or implied, of such owner, and the negligence of such person shall be
imputed to the owner for all purposes of civil damages...." (Italics added.)
8
It will be noted that this section fixes liability upon a vehicle owner
for the operator's negligence to a third person which, as between the owner
and the injured person, is direct and unconditional within the limits set.
Unlike the imputation rule formulated by the courts and applied as between spouses (which rests primarily on the community recovery), the
6 "Straightforward amending of the contributory negligence doctrine to allow recovery in
proportion to responsibility for the accident would seem called for." 2 AP.sTRONG, CAlI=ORNA
FArmy LAW 1513 (1953). It appears that the type of legislative action suggested by Professor
Armstrong is particularly desirable since a fairer distribution of future earnings recovered in a
personal injury suit is possible. Rather than award the entire recovery to the injured spouse
without allowing the contributorily negligent spouse to share in the proceeds, a just apportionment can be established in what would have been community but for Civil Code § 163.5.
7 It should be noted that the doctrine of imputed negligence as between spouses was not
extended to a putative spouse, Caldwell v. Odisio, 142 Cal. App. 2d 732, 299 P.2d 14 (1956).

There is therefore no reason to believe that California courts will read putative spouse relief
into the terms of § 163.5. Indeed, this is hardly necessary as the separate recovery of the
putative spouse in personal injury cases would not be enlarged in any way by the section under
consideration.
8 CAL. VEH. CoDE § 66 reads as follows: "'Owner' is a person having all the incidents of
ownership, including the legal title of a vehicle whether or not such person lends, rents, or
pledges such vehicle...."
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negligence of the operator under section 402 is imputed to the owner by
statute.
On the other hand, section 163.5 is a recovery statute applicable only
as to spouses' actions in personal injury cases. Civil Code section 163.5
apparently was not intended to supersede or displace Vehicle Code section 402 in reference to spouses. Had the legislature so intended, it is presumed that it would have said so by proper amendment of the vehicle code.'
Therefore, if the defendant is now precluded from imputing the negligence
of the errant spouse to the injured spouse because of Civil Code section
163.5, he still has a second string to his bow and may impute the negligence of the driver-spouse to the injured owner-spouse under Vehicle Code
section 402. The possibility, it must be noted, is narrow and can be applied
only in a few situations.' 0
Determination of when Vehicle Code section 402 may be applied to
the collision cases involving the spouses as passengers or drivers would
seem to rest on three factors. First, the separate or community character
of the automobile; second, in whose name or names the vehicle is registered; and finally, who is guilty of contributory negligence. Should either
or both of the last two factors be such that, absent other facts, it would
bring them within the scope of the vehicle code section, applicability of
that section, in the last analysis, rests on the first factor-the community
character of the automobile.
If the automobile is community property,registered in the names of both
of the spouses, and the husband is driving, the wife, as a co-owner, may not
be charged with her husband's contributory negligence in the operation of
the community automobile under Vehicle Code section 402. He has the
management and control of the community vehicle under Civil Code section 172, and therefore no consent of the wife, express or implied, to the
husband's use of such automobile can add anything to his right in that
regard." Since she cannot give such consent, section 402 has no application as to her rights. Under section 163.5, then, the wife can fully recover
for her injuries.
The converse situation (the husband suing as the injured passenger
and the wife contributorily negligent in driving the community vehicle)
presents a more difficult question. It is true that the consent of the one
co-owner of an automobile is not generally required for its use by the other
co-owner.' Although the wife would appear to be a co-owner of the com9Note that Civil Code § 171(c) was amended together with the enactment of Civil Code
§ 163.5.
1o Even where recovery is allowed under Vehicle Code § 402, such recovery is limited by
terms of Section (b) of the statute to $5,000 for death of or injury to one person in any one accident, and $10,000 for death of or injury to more than one person in any one accident. The
limit for damage to property is $1,000.
". Wilcox v. Berry, 32 Cal. 2d 189, 191, 195 P.2d 414, 415 (1948) ; Cox v. Kaufman, 77
Cal. App. 2d 449, 452, 175 P.2d 260, 261 (1946).
12 People v. One 1941 Buick Club Coupe, 72 Cal. App. 2d 593, 597, 165 P.2d 44, 47 (1946).
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munity automobile, 3 can it be argued that the husband, as manager of the
community,' 4 impliedly consents to his wife's driving the community vehicle, and therefore brings her within the meaning of "... any person...
operating ...with the permission.., of such owner. . ." as enacted in sec-

tion 402 of the vehicle code? If so, her negligence could be imputed to him.
In order to definitely negate this idea, to the express language of the statute
(".

.

. any person.. .") must be added, by implication, the words "other

than a co-owner."
Requirements for registration of motor vehicles 5 were enacted in the
interest of the public welfare, and to afford identification of vehicles and
persons responsible in cases of accident and injury. But the certificate of
registration has also been regarded an indicia of title.'6 Therefore, if the
vehicle is registered in the husband's name alone, a stronger case for applying Vehicle Code section 402 would be made out than where it was
registered in both spouses' names; certainly, a stronger evidentiary case
for "ownership" in the husband would exist.' 7
It would seem doubtful that the legislature intended to include a coowner wife as a negligent driver within the terms of Vehicle Code section
402. No case authority has been found directly in point for the obvious
reason that heretofore there has been no need to look to the provisions of
the vehicle code in order to impute the negligence of the errant spouse to the
injured spouse: imputation was accomplished as a result of the community
nature of the recovery and not by reason of Vehicle Code section 402.
Despite the argument advanced above as to the "consent" of the husband,
it would appear that he should be permitted to recover under section 163.5
where the wife has been negligent in her operation of the community automobile. It must be admitted, however, that there is room for doubt, particularly if the vehicle is registered solely in the husband's name.
If the automobile is separate property and registered in the name of
husband-owner" or of the wife-owner,"9 and the non-owner is the negligent driver, the operator's negligence will be imputed by statute to the
owner under Vehicle Code section 402 and will prevent recovery. But if the
13 Cox v. Kaufman, 77 Cal. App. 2d 449, 451, 175 P.2d 260, 261 (1946).
14 Id. at 452, 175 P.2d at 261 indicates that husband has the entire management and control of the community automobile notwithstanding Civil Code § 161 (a) which gives the wife
a "vested right" in the community property.
The proposition cited would not be valid in the rare instance where the wife has bought
the automobile with her earnings during marriage. Civil Code § 171(c) would be applicable
which gives the wife the management and control over community property earned by her and
not commingled with other community property.

15 CA. VEH. CODE § 140.
16

Caccamo v. Swanston, 94 Cal. App. 2d 957, 964, 212 P.2d 246, 251 (1949).

17 Cf. Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. 2d 350, 240 P.2d 604 (1952), which held Vehicle Code

§ 402 applicable as between the spouses where the vehicle was registered in the wife's name
even though the automobile was apparently community property.
18 Birnbaum v. Blunt, 152 Cal. App. 2d 371, 313 P.2d 86 (1957).
19 Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. 2d 350, 240 P.2d 604 (1952) ; O'Neill v. Williams, 127 Cal.
App. 385, 15 P.2d 879 (1933).
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vehicle is the separate property of either spouse and the owner-spouse is
also the negligent driver, the injured passenger-spouse may recover (as
against a third party2 ° ) for personal injuries suffered in an accident, even
where the owner-driver spouse was contributorily negligent; the negligence
is not imputed to the non-owner.
In the somewhat uncommon factual situation in which the wife can be
found to be the husband's agent while driving the community automobile,
her negligence may be imputed to him by general agency law. m
If the vehicle is jointly owned and it can be established that a joint
enterprise exists as between husband and wife, it may be argued that negligence should be imputed from one spouse to the other, and thus section
163.5 would have no application in this type of case.22 The difficulty in
accepting this view is that such is not the expressed intent of the legislature.23 The terms of section 163.5 would seem to apply whether the basic
principle is to prevent unjust enrichment resulting from the status of the
proceeds as community property, or arising by reason of the existence of a
joint enterprise.
Conflict of laws. -The recovery awarded to the injured spouse for personal injuries is declared to be his or her separate property by section 163.5
of the Civil Code. There is a question, however, as to the rights of a spouse
who is injured in California but who is domiciled in another community2
property state that continues to apply the imputation of negligence rule.1
This brings into focus the existing conflict of authority on the problem.
20

Vehicle Code § 403 (The California Guest Statute) applies only as to an action between
the driver and the passenger-guest, and not in an action against a third party defendant. The
Guest Statute can only come into play under the situations discussed if one spouse sues the
other. Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 219 (1909) established the rule of law that one
spouse may not sue the other in a civil action. This has been modified by Langley v. Schumaker,
46 Cal. 2d 601, 297 P.2d 977 (1956), which held the rule to apply only to tort actions on the
person and not to those involving property interests. Even though personal injury recovery is
no longer community property, the injury is a personal one and thus § 163.5 does not seem to
have changed the basic rule as to interspouse suits as established by the Peters case. Hence the
Guest Statute would not appear to be applicable.
21 Cf.De Armand v. Turner, 141 Cal. App. 2d 574, 297 P.2d 57 (1956). No agency would
seem to exist in the case of a husband for his wife since he has the management and control of
the community vehicle under Civil Code § 172, and he cannot be an "agent" of what he already
has control over.
22 The result was quite different prior to Civil Code §163.5 as recovery was community
property. Civil Code § 172 puts the management and control of community property in the
husband, and therefore no joint enterprise could exist so long as the recovery was community,
as joint control is lacking. Comment, 42 CA=nF. L. REv. 838 (1954).
For an excellent discussion of the whole joint enterprise problem, see Weintraub, The
Joint Enterprise Doctrine in Automobile Law, 16 Co=nr. L. Q. 320 (1931).
23 Senator James A. Cobey, drafter of Civil Code § 163.5, stated the purpose of the section this way: "I might say that my intention was to outlaw the imputation of the contributorily negligence of one spouse to the other . . .", in a letter from the senator to Mr. Ralph
N. Kleps, Legislative Council, Sacramento, copy to the writers of this comment.
24
See, e.g., Tinker v. Hobbs, 80 Ariz. 166, 294 P.2d 659 (1956) (Arizona); Ostheller v.
Spokane & I.E.R. Co., 107 Wash. 678, 182 Pac. 630 (1919) (Washington).
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Most courts 25 have adopted the rule that the right of the injured spouse
is to be determined by the law of the place where the accident occurred;
hence, as his right of action in California is his separate property, the fact
that the community property law of the domicile follows the doctrine of
imputed negligence would not prevent recovery. Some courts,' including
those in California, have adopted the rule that property rights thus acquired
would be determined by the law of the domicile, on the ground that the
cause of action is personal property.' Therefore, the community property
law of the domicile might prevent any recovery if one spouse were injured
by the contributory negligence of the other.
Where an injury occurs in California, it is hoped that an application of
section 163.5 will govern future decisions, whether the action be brought in
this state or in a foreign court, so as to allow recovery by the injured party.
If the action is brought outside of California, two arguments might be
advanced against the application of California law: first, the public policy
of the forum 28 prevents application of the law of the locus delicti

section

163.5; second, the provisions of the statute are remedial, rather than substantive, and therefore forum law should apply under the general rule that
the forum applies its own procedural law.29
It would appear that these arguments would not be enough to prevent a
foreign court from applying section 163.5. The fact that the wife's recovery will be her separate property, and that she will not be barred by her
husband's negligence, would not seem to offend the "public policy of the
forum"; this is adding to, rather than subtracting from, her rights. Further,
30
the recovery seems to involve substantive, rather than remedial rights.
That is, section 163.5 defines recovery rights rather than the means of enforcing such rights. Substantive rights are generally determined by the
lex loci delicti. 3 '
Collateral estoppel.-The court in Zaragosa v. Craven3 2 considered
(among other problems) the following question: is a wife barred from
bringing an action for personal injuries because her husband, in a former
suit on the same facts, had been adjudged contributorily negligent in the
25 Matney v. Blue Ribbon, 12 So.2d 249 (La. App. 1943), aff'd, 202 La. 505, 12 So.2d 253
(1943); Traglio v. Harris, 104 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1939), certiorari dismissed, 308 U.S. 629
(1939). See GOODRICH, CONFLXcT OF LAWS 260-261 (3d ed. 1943).
26 Bruton v. Villoria, 138 Cal. App. 2d 642, 292 P.2d 638 (1956); Roberts v. Magnolia
OF LAWS
Petroleum Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 142 S.W.2d 315 (1940); RESTATENENT, CO i=iCT
§ 290 (1934). See Page, Conflict of Law Problems in Auto Accidents, Wis. LAW REv. 145,
161 (1943).
SCAL. CIV. CODE § 953 defines a thing in action as "a right to recover money or other
personal property by a judicial proceeding." A cause of action in tort has been held to be
within the meaning of this section as property. Carver v. Ferguson, 115 A.C.A. 641, 254 P.2d
44, 45 (1953), hearing in Supreme Court granted, dismissed on stipulation (June 4, 1953).
28 See GooDRIcH, CONFLIcT OF LAWS 618-621 (3d ed. 1943).
29 Id. at 226-228.
3
0 Lykes Bros. SS. Co. v. Esteves, 89 F.2d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 1937).
31 Matney v. Blue Ribbon, 12 So.2d 249, 253 (La. App. 1943).
3233 Cal. 2d 315, 202 P.2d 73 (1949).
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same accident? In that case, decided in 1949, it was held that the community property nature of the recovery placed the wife in privity with her
husband and therefore precluded her relief. The question of liability of the
husband was res judicata as to the wife in her subsequent suit. The reason
given for the decision on this point was that a party, or one in privity with
him, is usually entitled to only one opportunity to litigate the same facts
same adversary and will be estopped from arguing them a second
with the
3
time.
With the enactment of section 163.5, it would seem that the collateral
estoppel argument introduced by the Zaragosa case must fall, since the
theory establishing privity between the spouses was based on the same
reasoning as that which imputed the negligence of one spouse to the other:
the unjust enrichment to the errant spouse because of his share in the community recovery. Existence of the marital relationship per se does not
require imputation of the negligence of one spouse to the other"; it seems
that the question of contributory negligence could be relitigated by the wife
under similar circumstances as those found in the Zaragosa case, as the
privity between herself and her husband is now lacking.
Parent'ssuit for the community on child's injury or death.-Will section 163.5 have any effect where there is an attempted recovery for the community by the parents in an action for the injury" or death36 of their
minor child? Since the parents' recovery for injury or death of the child
is on behalf of the community,37 California courts have held that the negligence of one parent is a bar to the other parent's recovery. Rationale for
such a holding is that the community would be enriched and the errant
spouse thereby would profit by his own wrong 8
The case of Flores v. Brown,39 decided in 1952, raised doubts as to
whether this was still the law. The case held that no imputation should
be imposed on the mother in her damage suit for her dead child where the
contributorily negligent father had been killed in the same accident. The
court reasoned that the negligent spouse, being dead, obviously could not
share in any community proceeds, and hence recovery should be allowed
for the child's death. Therefore if the Flores case is confined to its facts,
33 Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942);

RESTATEmNT,

JUDGMXNTS § 45(c) (1942). See 1 STAw. L. Rev. 765 (1949).

.

34

Campagna v. Market St. Ry., 24 Cal. 2d 304, 149 P.2d 281 (1944). See generally, 38

JuR., Negligence, 926-929 (1941).
A.m. 35

CAL.CODE Civ. PRoc. § 376.
6 CAL.CODE CIv. PROC. § 377.
37 Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 Cal.2d 1, 10, 187 P.2d 752, 758 (1947).
38
Kataoka v. The May Dept. Stores Co., 60 Cal. App. 2d 177, 140 P.2d 467 (1943);
Rosenbloom v. Southern Pac. Co., 59 Cal. App. 102, 210 Pac. 53 (1922). The child can bring
an action on his own behalf, and the rule would obviously have no effect. See Zarzana v.
Neve Drug Co., 180 Cal. 32, 179 Pac. 203 (1919).
3

3939 Cal. 2d 622, 248 P.2d 922 (1952).
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imputation will be removed only in the case where the negligent parent
cannot share in the community recovery.
With enactment of section 163.5, it may be argued that the injury to
the child was to be included within the section in the event the parent
brought suit for the community. As the section does not specifically state
upon whom the personal injury must have been inflicted in order for a
married person to recover damages, such an argument may have some
merit. However, this would seem to be a strained construction of the statute,
since such interpretation forces the conclusion that damages for personal
injuries caused to any person (ordinarily community property) must be
transformed into separate property as long as they are awarded "to a
married person."
It would seem better to read the award clause in the statute together
with the personal injury clause, and hold that it will have to be an injury
to the spouse in order to be included within section 163.5. In that case,
section 163.5 would have no application and existing rules will still apply."
Effect of Section 163.5 on Damage Recovery of the Spouses
What is the effect of that portion of section 163.5 that provides "All
damages, special and general ...are the separate property of such married person?" It will be necessary to preface this discussion by defining the
terms "general damages" and "special damages," as those terms are not
found in the Civil Code provisions defining compensatory relief. 1
General damages are an aggregate sum of money designed to compensate the injured party for the usual harms resulting from the unlawful act
or omission of another.42 Usual harms are first, the impairment of earning
capacity and second, pain and mental anguish.4" Compensation for impairment of earning capacity is assessed by the trier of fact considering the
age, sex, physical condition before and after the injury, and the activities
pursued by the plaintiff.4 4 Therefore, it is not necessary that the injured
party be gainfully employed in order to justify a recovery for the loss or
impairment of earning capacity. 45 Compensation for pain and mental an40 See Cossi v. Southern Pac. Co., 110 Cal. App. 110, 293 Pac. 663 (1930) ; Dull v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 27 Cal. App. 2d 473, 81 P.2d 158 (1938).
41
CA.. CIv. CODE §§ 3274-3360. But see 14 CAL. JUR. 2d, Damages §§ 22, 27 (1956).
42
As defined in Clare v. Sacramento Elec. Co., 122 Cal. 504, 55 Pac. 326 (1898) ; Lemere
v. Safeway Stores Inc., 102 Cal. App. 2d 712, 228 P.2d 298 (1951); Wilcox v. Sway, 69 Cal.
App. 2d 560, 160 P.2d 154 (1945).
43 Roedder v. Lindsley, 28 Cal. 2d 820, 172 P.2d 353 (1946) ; Kline v. Santa Barbara Ry,
150 Cal. 741, 90 Pac. 72 (1907) ; Storrs v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 134 Cal. 91, 66 Pac. 72
(1901).
44 It is sufficient in order to justify recovery of general damages, to allege in the complaint
that the plaintiff has suffered pain and mental anguish and that he has lost time from his
vocation, profession, or activity as a result of the described injury. Roedder v. Lindsley, 28
Cal. 2d 820, 172 P.2d 353 (1946) ; Osterode v. Almquist, 89 Cal. App. 2d 15, 200 P.2d 672 (1948).
45 Kline v. Santa Barbara Ry., 150 Cal. 741, 90 Pac. 72 (1901) ; Hume v. Lacey, 112 Cal.
App. 2d 147, 245 P.2d 647 (1948).
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guish is assessed by the trier of fact in its discretion, considering the
severity of the injury, the temperament of the injured party, and the facts
surrounding the incident out of which the cause of action arose.46
Special damages compensate the injured party for the unusual harms
resulting from the unlawful act or omission of another.4' Considered as
unusual harms are past and future medical expenses as well as awards
resulting from loss or damage to property.48 These losses, therefore, must
49
be alleged in the pleadings and proved with reasonable certainty.
Injury to a MarriedWoman Living with Her Husband
Special Damages.-It was formerly well settled that the husband, as
manager of the community, had the primary right to maintain an action
to recover for damage to, or loss of community property."0 The wife was
neither a necessary nor proper party to such an action. 5 Since section 370
of the Code of Civil Procedure permits a married woman to sue in all
actions involving injury to her person, an exception was made in personal
injury cases. 2 A married woman could recover community expenses arising
from her injury as well as compensation for injury to her person.P
Section 163.5 of the Civil Code encompasses all damages for personal
injuries. It may be argued that this is a clear mandate by the legislature
that all damages which can be recovered in a personal injury action will be
the separate property of the injured spouse. Such an interpretation would
require two assumptions. First, we must assume that the clause "special"
and "general" is to be read as emphasizing the word "all." Second, such
an interpretation presupposes that the injured party is the necessary and
proper party to maintain the cause of action for special as well as general
damages. Strict construction requires that the wife's medical expenses be
recovered in an action by her alone; community funds utilized for these
purposes become her separate property. In order to justify such an interpretation, it must be argued that the wife can recover as her separate
property an amount equal to all community property utilized for the expenses of her injury; otherwise, the husband's contributory negligence
would bar recovery of these expenses. Requiring the husband to forfeit his
interest in what would otherwise have been community funds may have
46

Wiley v. Young, 178 Cal. 681, 174 Pac. 316 (1918); Harris v. Lampert, 131 Cal. App. 2d
751, 4281
P.2d 292 (1955).
7
McCoRmacx, DAmAGES 299-301 (1935) ; 14 CAL. JuR. 2d, Damages § 26 (1956).
48
Martin v. Angel City Baseball Ass'n, 3 Cal. App. 2d 586, 40 P.2d 287 (1935) ; Sherwood
v. Thomas, 124 Cal. App. 450, 12 P.2d 741 (1932).
49
Lemere v. Safeway Stores Inc., 102 Cal. App. 2d 712, 228 P.2d 296 (1951); Sherwood
v. Thomas, 124 Cal. App. 450, 12 P.2d 741 (1932).
06Sanderson v. Nieman, 17 Cal. 2d 563, 110 P.2d 1025 (1941) ; Walling v. Kimball, 17
Cal. 2d 364, 110 P.2d 58 (1941).
51 Ibid.
52Louie v. Hagstroms Stores Inc., 81 Cal. App. 2d 601, 184 P.2d 708 (1947) ; Hyman v.
Market Street Ry., 41 Cal. App. 2d 647, 107 P.2d 485 (1940) ; Purcell v. Goldberg, 34 Cal.
App. 2d 647, 93 P.2d 579 (1939).
53 Ibid.
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some justification when his negligence has contributed to the wife's injury;
however, there would appear to be no reason for such a result when the
husband has not so contributed.
Classifying statutes either as mandatory or directory is useful in determining the effect to be given to statutory provisions." Mandatory statutes
are those which by their terms create new rights and also set forth the
mode by which such rights are to be enjoyed or acquired.5 5 They are strictly
construed, to avoid interference with the vested rights of others.55 It may
therefore be questioned whether section 163.5 should be considered a
mandate. It would appear that it should not, for the following reasons.
First, in order to interpret the section as mandatory, the right of the injured party to maintain the cause of action for special damages must be
implied. Second, if the statute is strictly construed, the vested rights of the
husband in community property will be forfeited.
Section 163.5 states only that all damages, special and general, are the
separate property of the injured spouse. The statute may therefore be considered directory and be liberally construed in the light of other statutes.
It is submitted that California statutes, when interpreted in the light of
section 163.5, should not permit a married woman to maintain an action for
the recovery of the expenses arising from her injury if such expenses have
been paid from community funds. Section 370 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes a married woman to sue without joining her husband in
all actions arising out of injury to her person. 57 This section has not been
interpreted as creating substantive legal rights in the wife.5" Since section
163.5 provides that the special damages awarded will be the separate property of the injured spouse, cases interpreting section 370 as permitting a
married woman to recover the expenses of her injury should no longer be
in point since they proceed on the presumption that any recovery by a
married woman will be community property.5 9
The husband's action for recovery of expenses arising from injury to
his wife is called an action for consequential damages.6 0 Section 427 (9) of
the Code of Civil Procedure permits the husband's cause of action for consequential damages to be joined with the wife's cause of action for personal
injuries."1 This section has not been amended. It can, therefore, be con54 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5801 (3d ed. 1943).
55

Id. at § 5815.
56 Ibid.
57
CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 370: "A married woman ... may sue without her husband being
joined as a party in all actions ... for injury to her person .... "
58 Sanderson v. Nieman, 17 Cal. 2d 563, 110 P.2d 1025 (1941) ; Giorgetti v. Wollaston,
83 Cal. App. 358, 257 Pac. 109 (1927).
59Supra note 52.
60 Sanderson v. Nieman, 17 Cal.2d 563, 110 P.2d 1025 (1941); Sheldon v. Steamship
Uncle Sam, 18 Cal. 526 (1861).
61 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 427: ". . . [AIll damages suffered or sustained by husband
alone including loss of services by his wife, moneys expended or indebtedness incurred by such
injury to his wife, may be alleged and recovered without separately stating such cause of
action."
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cluded that if the legislature had intended the husband to forfeit his interest
in community property, section 427(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure
would have been amended so as to deny the existence of the husband's
right to maintain the action for losses arising from his wife's injury.
Section 171c of the Civil Code has been amended, deleting the provision relating to personal injury awards recovered by the wife.' It seems
clear that the wife should no longer be able to recover community property
expenses arising from her injury because community recovery by the wife
in personal injury cases is no longer possible. Section 172 of the Civil Code
has not been amended so as to limit the husband's right to control and
manage community property. 63 This would seem to imply that the husband
is still the proper party to maintain the action for loss or damage to the
community.
If section 163.5 of the Civil Code is to be interpreted so that the husband will forfeit his interest in community funds recovered by the wife,
the effect will be a partial division of community property. Such a construction would be inconsistent with the existing statutory scheme relating
to division of community property. Apportionment of community property is authorized only on dissolution of the marriage by death" or divorce, 65 or by agreement of the parties.6 It would seem that the general
rule still applies: the husband, as manager of the community property,
is the proper party to maintain an action for loss of, or damage to, community property. The wife, neither a necessary nor proper party to that
action, may not maintain an action for the recovery of expenses arising
from her injury unless her separate property has been utilized or obli67
gated for their payment.

Further, under the construction suggested, the clause "special and general" is not without meaning. If the wife utilizes her own property for the
expenses of her injuries, her recovery should be, and is by the terms of
section 163.5, her separate property. When community funds are utilized
for the wife's expenses, the husband's award would continue to be community property and recovery would be barred should his negligence
contribute to his wife's injuries."
GeneralDamages.-Before the enactment of section 163.5 of the Civil
Code, either husband or wife could maintain an action for impairment of
62

Supra note 9.
63 CAL. CIV. CODE § 172: "The husband has the management and control of the community personalty with like power of disposition . . . as he has of his separate estate ...
;
Compare: Louisiana Civil Code art. 2402 (supra note 5) (both the cause of action and the
recovery for the wife's personal injuries are her separate property).
64 CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.
65 CAL. CIv. CODE § 146.

66 CAL. CIV. CODE § 158.

67 Fawsett v. Nascimiento, 108 Cal. App. 14, 291 Pac. 267 (1930).
68 Cf. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (where the general recovery
was not community property, an action by plaintiff's mother to recover medical expenses barred
by husband's contributory negligence).
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the wife's earning capacity. Early cases permitted the husband, as manager of the community property, to recover for loss of his wife's services
as an impairment of the community's capacity to accumulate property."
More modern cases allow the wife to recover community property money
damages for impairment of her earning capacity. 7 The ratio decidendi of
the later cases is that the impairment of one's earning capacity is violative
of a personal right for which the injured party is entitled to compensation. 7'
Since the husband's recovery for loss of services and the wife's recovery for
impairment of her earning capacity are one and the same, the husband may
not recover for loss of his wife's services if the wife has recovered for impairment of her earning capacity. 72 Though there are no cases in point,
most authorities agree that the wife would have been given the award for
loss of her earning capacity in preference to the husband's claim for loss of
her services. 73
General damages include the award for loss or impairment of earning
capacity as well as pain and mental anguish. 74 If the wife, under existing

law, is the proper party to bring the cause of action for impairment of her
earning capacity, then compensation for such a loss, by operation of section
163.5 of the Civil Code, will be her separate property. The recovery for pain

and mental anguish would also be her separate property by terms of the
section. Unless there is an agreement between the spouses that the wife's

accumulations will be community property, 75 the husband could not maintain an action for impairment of his wife's earning capacity.
It would seem that the intent of the legislature was to create a separate
property interest in the recovery for direct physical harm to a married
person.7 , In an action for personal injury to the wife, the husband may also
69
Martin v. Southern Pac. Co., 130 Cal. 285, 286, 62 Pac. 515 (1900) (while the husband
has no right to his wife's services, he may, as manager of the community property, maintain
an action for any wrongful act which deprives either himself or his wife of the capacity to
accumulate
community property).
70
Martin v. Costa, 140 Cal. App. 494, 35 P.2d 362 (1934); Davis v. Renton, 113 Cal.
App. 561, 298 Pac. 834 (1931) ; Gotsch v. Market Street Ry., 89 Cal. App. 477, 265 Pac. 268
(1928).

71 Ibid.

72 Robbins v. Roques, 128 Cal. App. 1, 16 P.2d 695 (1932).
73 2 A.

sTRONo,

CATIORNIA FAmrm

LAW 1501 (1953); De Funiak, Personal Injuries

under the CaliforniaCommunity Property Law, 15 LA. L. Rxv. 526, 530 (1955) ; see CAL. Civ.
CODE § 171C.
74
Supra note 46. Exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to actual damages:
CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294. It would seem that where exemplary damages are awarded, they would
be the separate property of the injured spouse.
75 CAL. Cxv. CODE § 158: "Either husband or wife may enter into any agreement or transaction with the other ... respecting property which either might if unmarried .... ." If there
is an agreement to the effect that all accumulations will be community property as per § 158,
then it seems that the obvious import of § 163.5 is nullified and the rules governing community
property would govern. Cf. Perkins v. Sunset Tel. and Tel. Co., 155 Cal. 712, 103 Pac. 190
(1909) (a contract between husband and wife that all community property to be acquired by
either should become the sole and separate property of the wife held valid as against third
parties).
7
0Supra note 23.
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recover community property money damages for loss of his wife's consortium.72 The physical and sentimental society of a wife has been recognized

as a legally protected right in California.78 As there is no physical harm,
but only an impairment of a personal right, section 163.5 of the Civil Code
would not appear to be applicable. Thus, the recovery for loss of consortium would continue to be community property.
Injury to a MarriedMan Living with His Wife
Special Damages.-When the husband is injured, he is the necessary
and proper party to maintain the cause of action for recovery of community funds utilized for expenses arising from his injury.79 His wife is neither
a necessary nor proper party to that action.8" Section 163.5 would have
the effect of transforming an award which would otherwise be community
property, 81 into the separate property of the husband. Unless a lien8 2 or
constructive trust were imposed on that part of the recovery which includes
the award of community property, the wife, having no direct recourse
against the wrongdoer, would be without means to protect her interest in
these community funds.
There would appear to be no reason why section 163.5 could not be
interpreted in the same manner suggested in the instance where the community property has been utilized for the wife's injury; that is, by limiting
the effect of the statute to an award which is compensation for the husband's separate property loss. Where the husband has utilized his separate
property for the expenses arising out of his injury, his recovery should be,
and is under section 163.5, his separate property.
It may be argued that a distinction can be made between the husband's
right to recover community property expenses and his right to recover com77 Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 288 P.2d 1003 (1955), hearing denied by Supreme
Court; Comment, 7 HEASTINGs L.J. 326 (1956).
78 Ibid. A wife has a cause of action for loss of consortium resulting from negligent injury
to her husband. Deshotel v. A.T.&S.F. Ry., 156 A.C.A. 325, 319 P.2d 357 (1957), (hearing in.
Supreme Court granted). It would seem that her recovery would also be community property
unless it could be argued that the invasion of her personal right to her husband's consortium
is a personal injury to her within the meaning of § 163.5.
70 10 CAL.JuR. 2d, Community Property § 70 (1956). But cf. 2 APaRSTRONG, CALIFoRNIA
FAmmy LAW 1505 (1953) ; Follansbee v. Benzenberg, 122 Cal. App. 2d 466, 265 P.2d 183 (1954).
80 Ibid.
81
CAL-. Civ. CoDE § 161a: "The respective interests of husband and wife in community
property during the continuance of the marriage relation are present, existing, and equal... 2'
82 A lien has been allowed on the husband's separate property where he has, without his
wife's knowledge and consent, utilized community funds for the removal of encumbrances or
improvement of his separate property. It may be argued that the use of community property
for creating a cause of action for special damages is analogous to the use of community funds
for improving the husband's separate property. Even though a cause of action is considered
property, the analogy seems to be erroneous since the funds would probably be used with the
wife's knowledge and consent; further they are not paid to a third party to enhance the separate property of the husband. See Annotation, 53 A.L.R.2d 729; De Funiak, Improving Separate Property or Retiring Liens or Paying Taxes on Separate Property with Community

Funds,9 HAsTINos L.. 36 (1957).
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pensation for his personal injuries. In the former instance, it may be said
that his right to recover is based on his statutory control and management
of community property.8" In the latter instance, the husband's recovery
rests on his right of compensation for injury to his person."' Thus, the
husband, in his capacity as manager of the community property, is not
within the terms of the statute under consideration. Thus, should the husband recover community property as compensation for expenses arising
from his injuries, the award would not be his separate property.
GeneralDamages.-Thehusband's earnings are community property. 85
They are primarily used to support the family.8" Section 163.5 of the Civil
Code creates a separate property interest in the husband's award for impairment of his earning capacity. There would appear to be no way in
which his wife can claim an interest in the recovery. To allow the husband to recover the award for impairment of his earning capacity as his
separate property is tantamount to denying to the community earnings
which it might otherwise have received. However, such a result appears inevitable until the legislature makes possible a more just result by apportioning future earnings to the community. s8
Injury where the Spouses are Living Apart.-The earnings and accumulations of a married woman living apart from her husband are her separate property. 9 Section 163.5 makes no change in this regard. Until the
enactment of the section under consideration, the earnings of a married
man unjustly abandoned by his wife were his separate property;" but, since
an award of damages is not considered earnings, an award to a married man
living apart from his spouse through her fault would have been community
property. Section 163.5 modifies this by making damages awarded to a
married man his separate property without regard to whether or not he is
living with his spouse.
Settlements of a Cause of Action for Personal Injury.-The earnings
and accumulations of husband and wife after marriage (except those by
gift, devise or bequest) are community property."' A cause of action for
personal injuries has been held to be community property.9 2 Recoveries
by way of settlement likewise have been held to be community property. 93
A settlement is not made by a legal tribunal. 4 It is an agreement made
83 Supra note 63.
84
Supra note 23. But see Martin v. Southern Pac. Co., supra note 69.
85 CAL. Civ. Coom § 164.
86 Shelby v. Peters, 53 Cal. App. 288, 200 Pac. 364 (1921).
87 Supra note 79.
88
Supra note 6.
89 CAL. Civ. CODE § 167.
90 CAL. CrV. CODE § 175.

91Supra
note 85.
92
McFadden v. Santa Ana Ry., 87 Cal. 464, 25 Pac. 681 (1891).
93 Schecter v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. 2d......... 314 P.2d 10 (1957).
94

BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1538 (4th ed. 1951).

Mtay, 1958]

COMMENTS

by the parties privately involved in the action. 5 It may be argued that, as
section 163.5 of the Civil Code, by its express terms applies only to damages awarded by a court of law, it has no application to a settlement brought
about by the parties. Thus, a settlement would retain its community
character.
The fallacy in the argument would appear to be that it presumes the
cause of action under section 163.5 of the Civil Code to be community
property. This concept would have to be urged, despite the fact that the
section under consideration makes the damages the separate property of
the injured spouse. It may be argued that there being no reference to the
cause of action in section 163.5, such cause of action must continue to be
community property. However, should the cause of action result in an award
of damages, such damages would be separate property. This conclusion
would be a return to the now discredited argument that the property character of the cause of action and the recovery can be split 6 Since the award
in a court of law for personal injuries is separate property, it would seem
that the cause of action as well must be separate property. Thus, a settlement arising from the cause of action would also be separate property.
The practical result of characterizing a settlement as community property
might be to continue litigation for no purpose other than to insure that the
recovery will be separate property.
Although section 163.5 has gone far in clearing up a previously confusing area of California community property law, it is hoped that the
section has not raised more problems than it has solved.

95 Ibid.
96 Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 202 P.2d 73 (1949), overruling Franklin v. Franklin, 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 155 P.2d 637 (1955) which held: while the property character of the
cause of action could be community the recovery might be separate property. The court at
page 320 stated: " ... [Ilt must be considered that the cause of action for personal injuries
suffered by either spouse during marriage... as well as the recovery therefore constitute community property ... and any contrary implications of the Franklincase are disapproved."

